The plenary session room will have one overhead projector, one screen, and one data projector.
SAGT does not provide computers for any speaker.
If an electronic presentation is planned, the speaker must use his/her own computer (VGA Analog Plug, 230V/60Hz Euro Plug - no 110V Support).
The contributed talks should have a length of 20 minutes, plus some additionally minutes for discussion.
Session Chair: Petra Berenbrink
Martin Hoefer and Alexander Souza
The Influence of Link Restrictions on (Random) Selfish Routing.
Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths:
Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy.
Leah Epstein and Rob van Stee
The price of anarchy on uniformly related machines revisited.
Michal Feldman and Tami Tamir
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games.
Session Chair: Bernhard von Stengel
Shuchi Chawla and Tim Roughgarden
Bertrand competition in networks.
Moshe Babaioff, Patrick Briest and Piotr Krysta
On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems.
Pavlos Efraimidis and Lazaros Tsavlidis
Window-Games between TCP flows.
Price Variation in a Bipartite Exchange Network.
Christos Papadimitriou18:00 Bus transfer from the venue to the historical town hall of Paderborn
The Search for Equilibrium Concepts.
Session Chair: Berthold Vöcking
Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis Kaporis and Paul Spirakis
Atomic congestion games: fast, myopic and concurrent.
Gunes Ercal, Rafit Izhak-Razin, Rupak Majumdar and Adam Meyerson
Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks.
Rainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas and Andreas Pieris
Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture.
Matthias Englert, Thomas Franke and Lars Olbrich
Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria.
Session Chair: Peter Widmayer
Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski and Lisa Fleischer
Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions.
Jon Feldman, S Muthukrishnan, Evdokia Nikolova and Martin Pal
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling.
Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano and Carmine Ventre
Alternatives to Truthfulness are Hard to Recognize.
Markus Blaeser and Elias Vicari
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design and
Algebraic Communication Complexity.
Experimental Results on the Process of Goal Formation and Aspiration Adaption.
Session Chair: Dov Monderer
Nadine Baumann and Sebastian Stiller
The Price of Anarchy of a Network Creation Game with Exponential Payoff.
Ulrich Faigle and Britta Peis
A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games.
Arndt von Schemde and Bernhard von Stengel
Strategic characterization of the index of an equilibrium.
Oren Ben-Zwi and Amir Ronen
The Local and Global Price of Anarchy of Graphical Games.
Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Games.
Session Chair: Dimitris Fotakis
Sébastien Hémon, Michel de Rougemont and Miklos Santha
Approximate Nash Equilibria for multi-players Games.
Amos Fiat and Hila Pochter
Subjective vs. Objective Reality - the Risk of Running Late.
Felix Brandt and Felix Fischer
On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria.
Christine Chung, Katrina Ligett, Kirk Pruhs and Aaron Roth
The Price of Stochastic Anarchy.
Session Chair: Marios Mavronicolas
Janina Brenner and Guido Schäfer
Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and their Applications to Scheduling Problems.
Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden and Mukund Sundararajan
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
Niv Buchbinder, Liane Lewin-Eytan, Seffi Naor and Ariel Orda
Non-Cooperative Cost Sharing Games via Subsidies.
Yvonne Bleischwitz and Florian Schoppmann
Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location.